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LABOR LAW-COMPULSORY ARBITRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES-

In I 947, seven states 1 adopted legislation for compulsory arbitration
of labor disputes in public utilities. Four more 2 provide for seizure of
such industries in cases of strikes or lockouts, and one 8 prohibits picketing
or interference with the service of a public utility. In addition, procedures for conciliation, mediation, or voluntary arbitration with suspension of the right to strike or lockout during such procedures, are provided
by still others.4 Such legislative activity reflects the growing public
concern regarding labor disputes and indicates that many state legislators
'are convinced that to secure industrial· peace more is required than the
mere imposition of a duty to bargain collectively. While the wave of
postwar strikes did not demonstrate that the National Labor Relations
Act5 failed in all its objectives, or that it was poor policy, such strikes did
show that it failed to achieve one of its primary objectives, namely,

1

Fla. Laws (1947) c.,2391 I; Ind. Acts (1947) c. 341; Mich. Stat. Ann.' (1947)

§ 17.454; Neb. Laws (1947) c. 178; N.J. Laws (1947) c. 75; Pa. Laws (1947) No.
485; Wis. Laws (1947) c. 414. The Michigan act was declared unconstitutional as
a violation of the clause in the Michigan Constitution providing for the division of the
powers of state government [Mich. Const. (1908) art. 7, § 9]. Local 170, Transport
Workers Union of America, C.I.O. v. Gadola, (Mich. 1948) 34 N.W. (2d) 71. The
New Jersey act was held not to violate either the state or federal constitutions in State v.
Traffic Telephone Workers, (N.J. Ch. 1948) 22 L.R.R.M. 2469.
2 Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, Supp. 1947) c. 150B; Mo. Laws (1947) H.B. 180;
N.D. Rev. Code (1943) § 37-010~; Va. Acts (1947) c. 9.
8 Tex. Laws (1947) c. 84.
4 Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 97, § 3 I; Minn. Stat. (1945) c. 179; Ky. Rev. Stat.
(1946) § 336.140; Iowa Code (1946) c. 90. Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1941)
c. 10, § 20 et seq. requires that an application by a party for government intervention
contain a promise to abstain from a strike or lockout for three :weeks. Nev. Comp. Laws
(Hillyer, 1929) § 2763 et seq. permits voluntary submission of disputes to arbitration
with prohibition of strike or lockout during arbitration and three months thereafter.
5 49 Stat. L. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. (1946) § 151.

COMMENTS

2 43

industrial peace. This comment will consider some of the legal problems
raised by those statutes providing for compill.sory arbitration.

I
STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The Florida statute 6 is fairly representative of those providing for
compulsory arbitration of disputes arising in public utilities. A public
utility employer is defined as one rendering "electric power, light, heat,
gas, water, communication or transportation services to the public." 7 If
the dispute reaches an impasse and the governor believes that interruption
of the service will inflict severe hardship on a substantial number of
persons, he may appoint a conciliator who is to attempt to effect a settlement. Strikes and lockouts are prohibited during the settlement procedure and during the effective period of an order of the arbitration
board. If the conciliator fails to settle the dispute, the governor may
appoint a three-man arbitration board,8 whose decision binds the parties
for one year unless they mutually agree to a change. Both parties have
the right to be present during hearings by the board, personally and by
counsel, and have the right to present such evidence as the board deems
relevant to the issues in controversy. Where wage rates or conditions
of employment are in dispute, the board must establish rates and conditions comparable to those prevailing in similar utilities in the same or
adjoining labor market areas, and must consider the overall compensation
received, taking into consideration wages for time not worked, pension
and insurance benefits, and continuity and stability of employment.
Either party may petition the circuit court for review within I 5 days
following the board's order, but only upon the following grounds:
(I) lack of reasonable opportunity to be heard; ( 2) that the decision is
not supported by the evidence; (3) that the board exceeded its powers;
or ( 4) that the order was procured by fraud or other unlawful means.
Violation of the act by any member of a group of employees acting in
concert, or by any employer or officer acting for an employer, or by any
other individual, is a misdemeanor punishable by fine up to $ I ,ooo, or
by imprisonment up to I 2 months, or both. Further, the union or utility
may be fined for strikes and lockouts up to $10,000 per day for each
day's interruption of service. Individuals adversely affected by violations
of the act may petition the courts to enjoin such violations; however,
no court has power to issue process to compel an individual employee to
render labor or service or to remain at his place of employment without
6

Fla. Laws (1947) c. 23911.
7 Id. § 2(a).
8 The employees' representative, the employer, and the governor each designated
one member of the arbitration board. The composition of th~ board varies under the
severaY statutes.
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his consent. The right of employees to quit, except in concert with others,
is expressly guaranteed.
The compulsory arbitration statutes of the other six states contain
substantially the same essential provisions as the Florida act except in
the following particulars. The Michigan statute 9 contains no provisions
expressly guaranteeing the parties the right to be heard and to present
evidence to the board, nor provisions for review of the board's decision
by the courts.10 Neither the Michigan nor the New J ersey 11 act provides
standards to guide the board in establishing wage rates or working
conditions. While the Michigan act includes hospitals and municipally
owned utilities as well as public utilities, it fails to define "utility." All
except Michigan and Nebraska 12 provide for fines against the union or
utility for interruption of service due to strikes or lockouts. Florida,
Indiana,13 Michigan and Pennsylvania 14 give individuals adversely
affected by violations of the statute the right to petition the courts for
injunctions. In addition to compulsory arbitration, the New Jersey act
authorizes seizure and operation of the utility by the governor. Nebraska
makes no provision for conciliation or mediation, but provides that all
disputes involving a public utility shall be settled by invoking the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. Activities made unlawful
generally parallel the Florida act, with variations in the penalties imposed. However, Nebraska makes it unlawful also to aid a strike or
lockout by providing funds for the conduct thereof or by paying strike
or unemployment benefits to strikers. Wisconsin 15 makes no provision
for fines or imprisonment for unlaw~l activity, and New Jersey provides
penalties only where unlawful activity is engaged in by union or utility
officials.

II
CONSTITUTIONALITY

A. Affectation With a Public Interest. In 1923 the United States
Supreme Court, in Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Co'lf,rt of Industrial
~elations of Kansas, 16 held that a statute requiring compulsory arbitration
9

Mich. Stat. Ann. (1947) § 17.454, declared unconstitutional in Local 170,
Transport Workers Union of America, C.I.O. v. Gadola, (Mich. 1948) 34 N.W.
(2d) 71. See Part III E, infra.
10
However, it is likely that the right to be heard would be implied from the
provision that the board shall "hold public or private hearings." Mich. Stat. Ann.
(1947) § 17.454(14). See Part III E, infra.
11
N.J. Laws (1947) c. 75.
12
Neb. Laws (1947) c. 178.
13
Ind. Acts (1947) c. 341.
14
Pa. Laws ( 1947) No. 48 5.
15
Wis. Laws (1947) c. 414.
16
262 U.S. 522, 43 S.Ct. 630 (1923).
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of a labor dispute in a small meatpacking firm deprived the employer
of property and liberty of contract without due process of law. The
statute declared that several activities, among which was the manufacture
and preparation of food for human consumption, were affected with a
public interest. The Kansas Court of Industrial Relations had ordered
an increase in wages after finding that, while closure of the plant would
not have great effect upon the supply of food in Kansas, the peace and
health of the public were imperiled by the dispute. The Supreme Court,
speaking through Chief Justice Taft, said: "To say that a business is
clothed with a public interest is not to determine what regulation may
be permissible in view of the private rights of the owner.... The regulation of rates to avoid monopoly is one thing; the regulation of wages
is another. A business may be of such character that only the first is
permissible; while another may involve such danger of monopoly on
the one hand, and such danger from stoppage on the other, that both
come within the public concern and power of regulation." 11
The Court indicated that Wilson v. New,1 8 decided in r9r7, had
gone to the borderline in sustaining, as against due process objections,
an act of Congress which temporarily provided for an eight-hour day
for railroad workers at compensation not less than that previously paid
for ten hours. This legislation was enacted at the request of the President
when a general strike of all railroad workers throughout the country
had been set for an early day. Chief Justice White, delivering the opinion
of the Court, foresaw a situation which "if not remedied, would leave
the public helpless, the whole people ruined, and all the homes of the
land submitted to a danger of the most serious character." 10 He said
that "engaging in the business of interstate commerce subjects the carrier
to the lawful power of Congress to regulate"; that "by engaging in a
business charged with a public interest, all the vast property and every
right of the carrier become subject to the authority to regulate possessed
by Congress to the extent that regulation may be exerted, considering the
subject regulated and what is appropriate and relevant thereto"; and
further that the right of the employee "to demand such wages as he
desires, to leave the employment if he does not get them, and, by concert
of action, to agree with others to leave upon the same condition" was
"necessarily subject to limitation when employment is accepted in a ·
business charged with a public interest." 20
In the Wolff case, Chief Justice Taft grouped businesses affected
with a public interest into three categories: (I) those carried on under
the authority of a public grant; (2) occupations historically regarded as
17

Id. at 539.
243 U.S. 332, 37 S.Ct. 298 (1917).
19
Id. at 351.
20
Id. at 352.

18
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exceptional; and (3) those not public at their inception, but which have
risen to be such. The first group was public utilities; the second, businesses such as "inns, cabs and grist mills," 2 1. was an historical classification
which survives today; the third, which alone needed definition, remained
indefinite.
The language of Chief Justice White in Wilson v. New indicates
that compulsory arbitration is due process as applied to businesses affected
with a public interest, and since, according to the definition contain<;!d
in the Wolff case, public utilities are affected with a public interest, the
conclusion might be drawn that the Court which decided Wilson v. New
would have sustained a Florida type statute, as' decided above. On the
other hand, the opinion in the Wolff case suggests to some extent that
that Court would have considered the danger to the public involved
from a work stoppage, that only where such danger was extreme would
regulation of wages have been permitted, and that the danger would
have had to be at least as great as that presented in Wilson v. New to
sustain such regulation. Under this approach it appears that the Florida
statute would not be due process except as it concerns water and perhaps
electric power, since work stoppages in the other utilities covered by that
act, while causing much inconvenience, would not involve the extreme
danger to the public which Chief Justice White foresaw as a result of
a general strike on the railroads. 22
However, the Wilson and Wolffcasesweredecided when the Court's
approach to social and economic legislation was very different from what ·
it is today. Thus, a re-examination of the constitutional issues presented
by compulsory arbitration is in order ..
The first change to be noted in the Court's approach is with respect
to price regulation, a problem analogous to compulsory arbitration in
its economic implications. At the time of the Wolff decision, the permissible range of statutory regulation of prices was measured by the
yardstick, "affected with a public interest." 23 In Tyson & Brother v.
Banton,24 Justice Sutherland explained the third category of Chief Justice
Taft's definition of affectation with a public interest as follows: "The
significant requirement is that the property shall be devoted to a use
in which the public has an interest." 25 Apparently this explanation was
not completely satisfactory, for four justices ,dissented from the decision
holding unconstitutional a New York statute prohibiting resale by brokers of theater tickets in excess of I 50 per cent of the price printed on the
2

See 39 YALE L.J. 1089 (1930).
See Simpson, "Constitutional Limitations on Compulsory Industrial Arbitration,"
38 HARV. L. REv. 753 at 775-776, 792 (1925).
28
39 YALE L.J. 1089 at II00 (1930).
24
273 U.S. 418, 47 S.Ct. 426 (1927).
25
Id. at 433.
1.

22
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ticket. Justices Stone, Holmes and Brandeis thought that price regulation was valid if there were circumstances "materially restricting the
regulative force of competition so that buyers or sellers are placed at
such a disadvantage in the bargaining struggle that serious economic
consequences will result to a very large number of members of the
community." 26 Justice Sanford claimed that the business involved was
affected with a public interest.
Nebbia v. New York 21 held that the concept "affected with a public
interest" was not restricted to public utilities or monopolies, but extended
to any industry which for adequate reason is subject to control for the
public good, the necessity for control being left primarily to the judgment
of the legislature. In Olson v. Nebraska 28 the Court said that the test
of affectation with a public interest had been discarded, and that the
wisdom, need and propriety of legislation should be left to the states
and to Congress.
Thus it is seen that the nebulous concept of affectation with a public
interest as the test of constitutionality of price regulation has been abandoned and this aspect of a contract is now subject to the same due process
test applied to other matters of contract; namely, "that the law shall
not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected
shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be
attained." 2 P
A change in attitude toward price regulation suggests that there may
have been a similar change with respect to regulation of the terms of
employment.
That there has been a change in the Court's approach toward labor
legislation has been demonstrated repeatedly. This was first indicated
by the Court's attitude toward "yellow dog'' contracts and other antiunion conduct by employers. In Adair v. United States,8° an act of
Congress declaring it a criminal offense against the United States for an
officer or agent of an interstate carrier to discharge an employee because
of his membership in a labor organization was held to violate the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court regarded it as the
right of the employee to sell his labor upon such terms as he deemed
proper, and said that the employer had the same right to prescribe the
conditions upon which he would accept such labor; that the employer
and employee had equality of right in such particulars and that any
legislation disturbing that equality was an arbitrary interference with
liberty of contract.
26

Id. at 451-2.
291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505 (1934).
28
313 U.S. 236, 61 S.Ct. 862 (1941).
29
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 at 525, 54 S.Ct. 505 (1934).
so 208 U.S. 161, 28 S.Ct. 277 (1908).
27
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The Adair case was reaffirmed in Coppage v. Kansas 81 in which was
held unconstitutional a Kansas statute making it unlawful for the employer or his agents to coerce or influence any person to enter into an
agreement not to join or become or remain a member of a labor organization as a condition of securing or continuing in employment. Holding
the statute violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court said that
the case could not be distinguished from Adair v. United States.
However, in r930, in Texas & N.O. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of R. &
S. Clerks, 82 the Court held constitutional the provisions of section 2,
Third, of the Railway Labor Act of r926,33 which provided that representatives of employers and employees should be designated by the
respective parties without interference, influence or coercion by either
party over the self-organization or designation of representatives of the
other. The Adair and Coppage cases were said to be inapplicable because
the act "does not interfere with the normal exercise of right of the
carrier to select its employees or to discharge them." 34 In Virginian
R. Co. v. System Federation No. 40 35 the r934 Amendment of the
Railway Labor Act, 36 requiring the railroads to bargain collectively with
the certified representatives of their employees, was held not to deny the
employer due process. The Court said that the purpose of the act was
to secure uninterrupted service of interstate railroads and that "it was
for Congress to make the choice of the means by which its objective"
was to be secured, and that the means chosen were "appropriate to the
end sought and hence are within the congressional power." 87 Again
the Adair al).d Coppage cases were said to have no application since the
act neither compelled nor precluded the making of any contract with
the individual employees and constituted no interference with" the normal
exercise of the right of the carrier to select or discharge its employees.
The Adair and Coppage cases were similarly distinguished in
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 88 which sustained the National' Labor Relations Act as a constitutional exercise of congressional
power, and affirmed the board's order that the employer cease and desist
from discriminating against union members with regard to hire and
• tenure of employment and from interfering with the employees' right
81

236 U.S. 1, 35 S.Ct. 240 (1915).
281 U.S. 548, 50 S.Ct. 427 (1930).
88
44 Stat. L. 577 (1927), 45 U.S.C. (1946) § 152.
84
Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of R. & S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 at 571,
50 S.Ct. 427 (1930). .
.
85
300 U.S. 515, 57 S.Ct. 592 (1937).
86
48 Stat. L. 1185 (1934), 45 U.S.C. (1946) § 151-163.
87
Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 at 553-4, 57 S.Ct.
592 (1937).
88
301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615 (1937).
82
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• of self-organization. In 1941, in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B.,39
the Court sustained the power of the board to issue back-pay orders for
workers refused employment solely because of their affiliation with a
labor union. The Court said: "The course of decisions in this Court since
Adair v. United States ... and Coppage v. Kansas ... have completely
sapped those cases of their authority." 40
Concerning minimum wage legislation the Court has similarly reversed its earlier position. In Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 41 citing
Adair v. United States and Coppage v. Kansas, the Court held unconstitutional a statute providing for fixing minimum wages for women and
children in the District of Columbia, and said that the class of cases "where
property is devoted to a public use" and "the owner thereby in effect
grants to the public an interest in the use which may be controlled by
the public for the common good" were inapplicable since "the statute
does not depend upon the existence of a public interest in any business to
be affected." 42 The Adkins case was overruled in 1937 in West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish,4 3 holding constitutional a Washington statute providing
for· fixing standards of wages and conditions of labor for women and
minors. It was argued that this case diffeFed from the Adkins case in
that the business of an innkeeper was affected with a public interest,
but the Court refused to base its decision upon that distinction. In delivering the majority opinion Chief Justice Hughes said, regarding liberty
of contract: "the liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organization
which requires the protection of law against the evils which menace the
health, safety, morals and welfare of the people" and "is thus necessarily
subject to the restraints of due process, and regulation which is reasonable
in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community
is due process." 44
In 1941, the wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act 45 were sustained by a unanimous Court in United States v. Darby
Lumber Co.,4 6 Justice Stone saying: "it is no longer open to question
that the fixing of a minimum wage is within the legislative power and
that the bare fact of its exercise is not a denial of due process under the
Fifth more than under the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor is it any longer
open to question that it is within the legislative power to fix maximum
hours .... Similarly the statute is not objectionable because applied alike
89

313 U.S. 177, 61 S.Ct. 845 (1941).
Id. at 187.
41
261 U.S. 525, 43 S.Ct. 394 (1923).
42
Id. at 546-547.
48
300 U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. 578 (1937).
44
Id. at 391.
.
45
52 Stat. L. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. (1946) § 201 et seq.
46
312 U.S. 100, 61 S.Ct. 451 (1941).
40

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 47

to both men and women." 47 The Darby case expressly overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart,48 which had held that Congress was without power
to exclude the products of child labor from interstate commerce, the
Court saying in the Darby case that in the exercise of the power of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce "it may choose the means
reasonably adapted to the attainment of the permitted end." 40
Thus it appears that, as with price regulation, so with wage, hour, and
<_:>ther labor legislation, the test of "affectation with a public interest" is
no longer applied, but rather that such legislation is due process as long
as it is not arbitrary and as long as it has a reasonable relation to a proper
public end.
B. The Test of Reasonableness. Compulsory arbitration, obviously
restricts the contractual liberty of the disputing parties, and it is necessary
to determine whether such legislation is arbitrary or unreasonable. The
test of reasonableness requires weighing the beneficial effects of the
statute against the restrictions imposed. Inquiry should be directed to
the need for the legislation, its probable effectiveness to correct the
existing evil, and the possibility of achieving the same result by other
means i,mposing less restriction upon individual freedom.
The need for legislation which will reduce work stoppages seems
indisputable in view of the wave of strikes in essential industries following
the end of World War II. More difficult questions are whether compulsory arbitration would correct the evil, and whether a less drastic
'measure could achieve the objective. Statutes requiring the filing, of
strike notices with government officials or commissions, and those providing for conciliation or mediation seem mainly to have resulted only
in postponement of strikes; not in settlement of disputes. While it is
improbable that compulsory arbitration would end all strikes, just as
statutes punishing larceny do not end all stealing, the legislative conclusion that it would materially reduce the number of strikes appears not
unreasonable. 50 The success or failure of peacetime compulsory arbitration can be determined accurately only by trial. The argument of
theorists that such legislation would result in more strikes is entitled to no
more weight than opposing arguments that such legislation is the panacea.
47

Id. at 125.
247 U.S. 251, 38 S.Ct. 529 (1918).
49
United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. IOO at 1-21, 61 S.Ct. 451 (1941).

48

110 This conclusion is supported by the experience of the fedeqtl government with
compulsory arbitration during World War II. The operations of the National War
Labor Board were based on a no-strike, no-lockout pledge by labor and industry
representatives in December, 1941, thus preserving a token of voluntarism. From a
legal standpoint, however, there was no contractual obligation to arbitrate. While
the wartime strike record was good, it is questionable whether this was due to a patriotic
desire not to obstruct the war effort or to compulsory arbitration. See 12 LAW & CoNTEM.
PRoB.

217 (1947); UPDEGRAFF & McCoY, ARBITRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES 9 (1946).

0
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With such a balance of opposing unproven arguments, 51 it is submitted
that the Court should respect the legislative choice.
C. The Thirteenth Amendment. It is sometimes asserted that prohibition of strikes imposes involuntary servitude in violation of the
Thirteenth Amendment. However, the existing statutes expressly preserve the right of the worker to quit, indicating a legislative distinction
between quitting and striking. There are in fact at least these differences:
(I) while strikes involve cessation of work in concert with others, quitting
may be done individually; ( 2) the striker intends to return to his job
and he considers himself, as the Taft-Hartley Act considers him/ 2 as
remaining in the employ of the business, while one who quits has no
intent to return to the job; (3) the purpose of the strike is to close
the plant for the purpose of enforcing through economic coercion the
demands of the workers, whereas the quitting employee severs all connection with his employer and ceases to have any further interest in the
employer's business.
Regarding differentiation on the basis of the presence or absence of
concerted activity, it is often asserted that illegality cannot be found
from the mere fact of concert; that what one may do alone, he also may
do jointly with others. Yet the distinction is well established at common
law, and is given current recognition in the anti-trust laws. 58
Suspension of the right to strike does result in some restraint upon
the freedom of the worker, but it is only the complete restraint of the
individual resulting from compulsory service when the right to quit
is suspended that is prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment, not
limitations upon the manner of exercising that right resulting from
suspension of the right to strike. 54
It is thus possible to distinguish striking from quitting, although it
must be conceded that this distinction is not razor sharp. For example,
the Florida statute gives the individual adversely affected by a strike
in a public utility the right to petition for injunction. The court order
would undoubtedly enjoin union officers to end the strike, thus aiming
at concerted activity. If the union officers should decide in obedience to
the injunction to order the men back to work, there would result a
restraint upon individual action achieved by indirection. However, the
employee could still exercise his right to quit without violating either
the injunction or the union command, thus again emphasizing the dis51

See JENSEN, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION OF LAlloR DISPUTES (1945).
P.L. 101, 80th Cong., 1st sess., c. 120, § 2(3).
58
Hogan v. O'Neill, 255 U.S. 52, 41 S.Ct. 222 (1921); Commonwealth v. Judd,
2 Mass. 329 (1807); State v. Hickling, 12 Vroom (41 N.J.L.) 208 {1879); State v.
Craft, 168 N.C. 208, 83 S.E. 772 (1914).
54
See Parkinson, "Constitutional Aspects of Compulsory Arbitration," 7 ANNALS
44 (1917).
52
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tinction between striking and quitting. It is submitted that the Court
should give legal recognition to these distinctions and hold that prohibition of strikes does not constitute involuntary servitude.5•
Even if it were impossible to distinguish between striking and quitting, prohibition of strikes in certain industries should not be held to
violate the Thirteenth Amendment. While the text of the Thirteenth
Amendment contains no express exceptions, it is recognized that it
does not prevent compulsory service by seamen, 56 by citizens on public
highways,5 1 or by soldiers. 58 There is little reason why an exception
should not be made covering strike action in those businesses in which
strikes would seriously endanger the public health or safety, a condition
present in certain, but not necessarily all, utility services.
D. Picketing and the Right to Strike. The question remains whether
the right to strike is one of the liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Thornhill v. Alabama<'> 9 held that there is a constitutional
right to engage in peaceful picketing. The rationale of the decision was
that picketing is free speech, but the Court intimated that it could be
enjoined if violent or if the publication were inaccurate, and in Milk
Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, lnc.,6° an injunction
against all picketing was affirmed because of a background of violence.
The test applied was apparently something less than a showing of clear
and present, grave and immediate, danger to the public welfare which
has been said to be necessary to restrict freedom of speech. 61 Thus the
Court does not accord picketing the same protection as other free speech,
and since the principal purpose of picketing is economic coercion, it is
possible to interpret the Thornhill case as extending constitutional protection, not to free speech as such, but to the use of economic force by
labor as a means of enforcing demands in a labor dispute.
But even under this interpretation,. the constitutional guarantee is
not absolute. In Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe,62 where
a cafe owner had contracted for the erection of a building not commercially connected with his restaurant business, and where the cafe was
picketed because nonunion labor was employed by the building contractor, there being no dispute between the cafe employees and the
owner, the Court affirmed an injunction prohibiting picketing of the
55
See GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 421 (1946) and Parkinson, "Constitutional
Aspects of Compulsory Arbitration," 7 ANNALS 44 ( 19 I 7), for opposing views concerning
whether abolition of strikes imposes involuntary servitude.
56
Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 17 S.Ct. 326 (1897).
57
Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 36 S.Ct. 258 (1916).
58
Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 38 S.Ct. 159 (1918).
59
310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940).
0
~ 312 U.S. 287, 61 S.Ct. 552 (1941).
1
~ Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 65 S.Ct. 315 (1945).
62
315 U.S. 722, 62 S.Ct. 807 (1942).
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cafe because the restaurant business had no connection with the building
dispute. Thus, the constitutional protection is restricted to the area of
the industry within which the labor dispute arose.
As striking, like picketing, is a means of enforcing demands in a
labor dispute by economic coercion, it can be argued that the Court
should extend to the strike the same constitutional protection given
picketing.63 However, it is hardly to be supposed that the Court will
concede that the picketing decisions rest on this dubious basis. The
attempt, rather, may be to tie the strike to the picketing cases by asserting
that a strike also involves an element of publication. This would clearly be
specious. A strike involves publicity, to be sure, but its dominant purpose
is to inflict economic injury. Picketing can much more easily, although
still with difficulty, be regarded as primarily a means of publicizing the
facts of the dispute, the injury to the employer being incidental, although
perhaps actionable, depending upon tort principles. If striking were the
only effective means of publication, the argument that it should be
accorded the same constitutional protection as picketing would have more
force. However, the propriety of considering alternative means of
publication was recognized in Cox v. New Hampshire 64 in which a statute
prohibiting parades without special license was sustained against the
contention that it constituted a deprivation of freedom of speech. The
Court thought it significant that the statute prescribed no measures for
suppressing other means of publication such as speech, writing, and
display of placards.
E. Procedural Due Process and State Constitutions. While the
above discussion indicates this writer's opinion that compulsory arbitration would survive the substantive test of constitutionality under the
Federal Constitution, questions concerning procedural due process and
the effect of state constitutions remain. The Michigan act, which pro63 The following in Stapleton v. Mitchell, (D.C. Kan. 1945) 60 F. Supp. 51 at
61, seems to support such argument: "The right to peaceably strike or to participate in
one, to work or refuse to work, and to choose the terms and conditions under which one
~ill work, like the right to make a speech, are fundamental human liberties which the
state may not condition or abridge in the absence of grave and immediate danger to
the community•••. Kansas has not only conditioned these rights, but expressly prohibited
them and made their exercise a criminal offense. In this setting we think it is the
inherent prohibitions of the statute standing alone which impose the unconstitutional
restraint, and those against whom the statute is plainly directed should not be required
to abide the processes of criminal justice in order to obtain the redress to which they
are entitled under the Federal Constitution." The statute involved in the case made it
a misdemeanor to participate in any strike, walkout or cessation of work or continuation
thereof without the same being authorized by a majority vote of the employees to be
governed thereby, and provided for fine up to $500, or imprisonment for six months,
or both, for violations. Upon action brought by a labor union, the court enjoined
enforcement of the statute.
64
312 U.S. 569, 61 S.Ct. 762 (1941).
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vided for appointment of a circuit judge as chairman of an arbitration
board, was declared unconstitutional as a violation of the clause contained
in the Michigan Constitution providing for the division of the powers
of state government.65 In the same case a portion of the Michigan Court
thought that the failure of the legislature to provide standards to guide
the arbitration board in establishing wages and conditions of labor
afforded a second ground of invalidity. However, the New Jersey act,
which similarly fails to provide such standards, was held constitutional
as against the attack that it constituted an unlawful delegation of legis:..
lative power. 66 ~other serious constitutional question concerning the
Michigan act would seem to exist in the lack of provisions for review of
the board's decision.
Where the business concerned is engaged in interstate commerce,
another, and perhaps the most difficult, question remains concerning
the impact of the Taft-Hartley Act upon state jurisdiction over labor
relations.67
James A. Sprunk, S.Ed.

65 Local 170, Transport Workers Union of America, C.I.O. v. Gadola, (Mich.
1948) 34 N.W. (2d) 71.
66 State v. Traffic Telephone Workers, (N.J. Ch. 1948) 22 L.R.R.M. 2469.
67 See Smith, "TJi.e Taft-Hartley Act and State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations,"
46 M1cH. L. REv. 593 (1948); Watt, "The New Deal Court, Organized Labor, and
the Taft-Hartley Act," 7 LAw. GUILD REv. 193 (1947).

